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Abstract
Climate change mitigation and adaptation requires global, coordinated responses. Each
region/country must do its part, led by multinational, multilateral actors and organizations on the
local, national and regional level. The European Union (EU) is the region!s representative. The
effectiveness of the Union, as an actor has been the subject of constant debate and scrutiny. A
review of existing International Relations (IR) theories and literature outlines the many factors
and conditions that influence and facilitate the EU’s ability to exert power and authority on this
issue. Drawing on that existing body of knowledge, this paper will argue the EU’s capacity as a
leader/“leadiator”1 can be determined by four basic internal factors - 1) Informed Public, 2)
Consensus, 3) Oversight and 4) Challenges. Case studies of Ireland and Sweden will be
presented to document these determinants, establishing a framework through which the EU’s
effectiveness can be assessed. The case studies will hopefully encourage larger and more
comprehensive comparative studies of the EU’s actorness.

1

Bäckstrand, K. and Elgström, O. “The EU’s Role in Climate Change Negotiations: From Leader to
‘Leadiator.” Journal of European Public Policy. May 22, 2013.
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Chapter I - Introduction
Drawing on the experience and activities of the European Union (EU) on climate change,
this paper examines the internal/domestic member states determinants of international
organization actorness. After reviewing current International Relations (IR) theories on
actorness and leadership, I have determined a basic list of such determinants. I will discuss how
they apply to the case of the EU. By way of illustration, they will provide the basis for a
comparative analysis of two member states, Sweden and Ireland, which have very different
climate change performance records. The discussion of these qualities or standards for actorness
will be examined to determine causal relationships, if any, with the EU capacity to act
autonomously.
No region is safe from the impending climate disasters but there is a deadline for how
long we have to avoid them. Each country and region must do its part to help stop the
destruction of our planet’s stability and security. The EU is vital because it is the governing
body for the continent. While there are other organizations in Europe like the Council of Europe
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, these organizations do not have
the governance authority that the EU has. Therefore, the EU is the best option in Europe to
coalesce and take action. An impending crisis such as this demonstrates why the Union was
created in the first place. Strength in numbers generates stability and an opportunity to effect
change that is far more impactful than each country going on its own.
The EU has long been in favor of environmental protection and preservation.2 As an
organization the EU may set goals and policies but member states are responsible for
incorporation and implementation. It is therefore imperative that the EU provide a multilevel,
2

Hill, C., Smith, M., and Vanhoonacker, S. International Relations and the European Union. Third
Edition Oxford, United Kingdom. Oxford University Press, 2017.
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multipolar system of governance to persuade and guide members to comply. In discussing the
question of whether or not the EU is capable of being an effective international actor on climate
change, I will present some of the most necessary elements which shape actorness. These
elements apply at the local level as well and will be tested and assessed in the cases of Ireland
and Sweden.
Despite the challenges of 2020 with the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU has further
endeavored to establish itself emphatically as a world leader on the climate agenda. On April
21st,2021 the European Commission announced an agreement with its member states on legally
binding climate change laws to reduce Green House Gas (GHG) emissions, a first for the region.
This agreement is intended to enforce compliance with the EU’s goal of reducing emissions 55%
by 2030, compared to 1990 levels and to achieve a rate of net zero by 2050. Steep reductions
such as this require swift, aggressive action. Should these GHG emissions fail to be reduced it
would result in the planet’s temperature rising above 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levels and would produce catastrophic results. This Green New Deal is a bold step forward for
the EU, establishing a new and legally binding framework on climate change regulation and
commitments. It demonstrates the Union’s ambition as an actor and sets precedent for the next
thirty years of climate change law. It communicates the Union’s ambitions and sense of
urgency.
The global damage that climate change presents will destabilize economies,
environments and security, creating an existential threat to all nations. Because of its borderless
nature, climate change is deeply intertwined with International Relations (IR). Adaptation and
mitigation work such as GHG reductions cannot take place in a vacuum. It is a massive

6

undertaking that requires global and regional coordination. The field of IR is an intrinsic part of
any such efforts, responsible for the cooperation in addressing and implementing this work.
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Chapter II - Literature Review
“Actorness” of International Organizations
International Organizations have been a "ubiquitous component of the IR landscape,”
according to Fomerand (2017)3. These organizations have succeeded in changing the paradigms
on many issues, such as climate change. Fomerand states that IOs are no longer "the playthings
of states or capitalism” because they now have "capacity.” The actorness of IOs can be
evaluated through various frameworks. Methods by which states and IOs pursue and leverage
power, often referred to as “leadership” types, are judged through the lenses of Realism,
Liberalism and Constructivism. Influence and capacity are achieved by and for various reasons
and explained by one of the above listed theories of IR. Historically, it was structural, military
and economic power (typically held or exercised by states) that were considered to be the
determinants of actorness, at least from the so-called Realists.4 These elements were required in
order to be judged as an effective and powerful actor within the IR landscape. However, the
proliferation of IOs in the latter half of the twentieth century and their expanding role in IR, has
led to a shift towards more Constructivist or Liberalist modes of explanation.
According to Sikkink (2011), the increase in activist networks has led to the “redefinition
of old norms, beliefs and legal accountability,” which in turn has generated new ones, heavily
shaped by these networks and IOs. This new form of leadership consists of multilevel or polycentric governance. Actorness or leadership, defined by Realist structural and military power

3

Fomerand, J. “Evolution of International Organization as Institutional Forms and Historical Processes
since 1945: ‘Quis Custodiet ipsos custodies?” ed. Bennett, R. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
International Studies, The International Studies Association, 2017.
4
Fomerand asserts that Realists such as Morgenthau, Mearsheimer, Carr and Bull do not have much
regard for IOs because they are a system that operates from a balance of power. Sovereignty is therefore
challenged for it cannot be divided within a system.
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thus seems to have been superseded or at least matched by idea-based leadership. An actor that
exercises this type of leadership falls under Constructivist or even Liberalist IR theory. The
cooperation between states and/or IOs represents a collaborative, directional leadership that
persuades and leads by example rather than military or economic coercion, a Constructivist
perspective. The Liberalist would classify IOs as the “leadiators” (Bäckstrand and Elgström,
2013), meaning a shift of strategy in reaction to issue-specific power distribution. The four
internal determinants I have outlined are especially relevant to the concept of leadiators for they
require collaborative, multipolar negotiation. Leadiators build coalitions across many levels.
For some critics, the shift away from traditional, Realist-based ideas around actorness
does not quite indicate a new era of intergovernmentalism, or new parameters around
supranational power. To them, liberal intergovernmentalism only appears to be new because it
is dealing with newer policy areas like climate change (Schimmenfennig, 2015). Be that as it
may, it does indeed appear that IOs, intergovernmentalism and activist networks have attained a
level of actorness on climate change that reflects a move away from traditional, top-down, statecentric Realism.
“Actorness” of the European Union
The EU has always been a major IR presence in terms of actorness and effectiveness. Its
size and economic power indicate its significance as an international actor. It has been an active
supporter of climate change mitigation and adaptation work. Yet it does not aspire to merely be
an advocate but a leading actor as well. Therefore, under what conditions does the EU become
an effective actor in terms of its capacity to lead its members?
As an actor, which leadership styles can be applied to the EU when dealing with climate
change? Wurzel et al. (2018) describe the EU’s leadership type as having four categories:

9

structural, entrepreneurial, cognitive and exemplary. Climate change issues do not typically
require military support so economic power is the more relevant of the two. Entrepreneurial is
about diplomatic and negotiating abilities. Structural and entrepreneurial leadership use
persuasion over force.
Cognitive leadership reframes climate issues by redefining problems and offering
solutions that are frequently guided by scientific expertise. This work is often shared by both
states and activist networks. They consider the EU a “normative power,” meaning it exerts more
influence than structural leadership. Their last style of leadership is exemplary, which
essentially means to lead by two examples: intentional and unintentional, in which actors adopt
changes purely for internal reasons, attracting followers too. The EU has clearly been applying
this type of leadership, as seen by its position and actions on climate change.
Additionally, Wurzel et al. identify two styles of leadership: humdrum/transactional and
heroic/transformational. The former is informed by incrementalism and no real long-term vision
or plans. The latter features smaller, short-term objectives to effect long-range, sweeping
change. To date, the EU appears to be attempting both.
Internally, the EU has taken firm steps to lead on climate change policy within the
frameworks described above. It has established an Emissions Trading System (ETS) to reduce
dependence upon oil and gas. The Union’s LIFE Program is the EU’s “adaptation and mitigation
program,”5 is committed to supporting the 2050 climate-neutral society with an approximate
budget of €905 million.6 Overall, the EU has allocated 30% of its total budget between 2021-

5

European Union. “LIFE Climate Change and Mitigation Adaptation.” European Union, 2021, Accessed
June 10th, 2021 at: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/budget/life_en.
6
Ibid.
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20277 to climate change mitigation and adaptation. It must be noted though, the EU budget is
funded by its members. EU budgets are smaller than individual member budgets. Additional
funding for the 2021-2027 period has been secured from the European Development Fund and
the Next Generation EU “recovery instrument” with €750 billion, totaling €1.8 trillion over this
period.8
On the other hand, according to Groen and Oberthür (2017), the EU has been more
successful than anticipated with regard to the Paris Agreement, improving its status as a
“leadiator." They contend its new status as a leadiator will continue to be faced with
unforeseeable, unpredictable geopolitical issues that will require refined, collaborative
approaches in order to be effective. Perhaps the old, Realist based definitions of actorness no
longer apply as they once did.
The EU!s ability to be an effective actor on the international stage today is the subject of
considerable discussion and debate among scholars. The EU is a relatively new, regional
organization comprised of sovereign member-states, causing some to refer to it as a “political
upstart.”9 Indeed, the EU is a relatively young organization but collectively it cannot be
considered a novice in IR. To dismiss Europe’s long and established history, its demonstrations
of power and influence is foolish. Therefore, its ability to coalesce and exert its collective
influence both internally and externally should not be dismissed. The EU
On that ground, it is important to analyze basic elements which determine the EU’s
ability to lead the region on climate change. There are numerous climate change actors and
7

European Council of the European Union. “Multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027 adopted.”
Accessed June 11th at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/17/multiannualfinancial-framework-for-2021-2027-adopted/.
8
Ibid.
9
Underwood, S. and Pinder, J. “The European Union: A Very Short Introduction.” Fourth Edition,
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 2018.
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organizations including governments, International Organizations (IOs) and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), which frequently coalesce into networks. When actors and organizations
work together, they evolve into activist networks, harnessing their power to make an impact on
issues through their reach and capabilities. There are also various frameworks with which
scholars view actorness and leadership. Hence, the need to examine the concept of actorness in
IR theory. For the EU to position itself as a leader on climate change we must have a baseline
understanding of the different lenses through which it is judged.
Organized efforts of this magnitude require leadership which is generally the domain of
the great powers. However, in the twenty-first century the definition of a great power appears to
have shifted. What constituted a great power in the past has evolved in tandem with the
establishment of the Bretton-Woods system, the United Nations, the end of the Cold War and the
rise of China, as well as the BRIC countries. The factors that determine a state’s status as a great
power can no longer be defined solely by its military and economic resources. The concept is
undergoing a new scrutinization, redefining what factors determine actorness and leadership
while broadening the discussion around the scope or sphere of influence of powers of IOs such
as the EU.
Some scholars classify the EU as “soft-power,”10 the concept of which has become a
topic of debate in the twenty-first century. The EU’s GDP is USD $15,626,448.48 (in
millions),11 right behind the United States (US) at USD $21,433,226.00.12 However it is
sometimes considered a trading-area rather than a sovereign state, though the strength of its

10
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World Bank. “GDP (US$) European Union.” World Bank, 2019. Accessed June 11th, 2021 at:
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economy and its trading power should leave little doubt as to its power and reach. In light of its
lack of sovereign status, it does not have a legal constitution. Nor does it have a military force.
Despite these facts it continues to affirm its intention of being a leading actor on climate change.
It is indeed a feat for the EU to have achieved unanimity with such a diversity of members and
opinions. This begs the question of whether or not the EU, as a soft power, is capable of
effecting meaningful change on a major issue such as climate change.
IR theorists have applied various analytic approaches to categorize and analyze the EU’s
leadership and actorness. Laatikainen (2003) discusses some of these approaches, focusing on
the lenses of capacity, identity and context. Her paper, which specifically discusses EU Foreign
Policy and the United Nations (UN), notes that the Union speaks to the world “with one voice.”13
Capacity or competence, is the byproduct of cohesion. It is the most comprehensive of the three
approaches mentioned above, regarding actorness. The fact that the Union speaks for all of its
members on any number issues from economic foreign policy, trade and security makes it the
region’s single most significant actor. Its capacity is the result of its members exchange of
information/ideas, coherence on policy and yielding to the governance of the Union. This soft
power is in fact, a success at being the region’s actor.
The power of the EU is the subject of Anu Bradford’s “The Brussels Effect: How the
European Union Rules the World” (2020). The organization has aggregated the economic power
of the region and is therefore making it the unilateral actor - the leader/leadiator. She maintains
the Union’s power is demonstrated by virtue of the fact that other nations assent to its standards,
regulations, legal frameworks and authority on all manner of issues from the environment to

13

Laatikainen, K. “Assessing EU Foreign Policy in the UN: Capacity, Identity and Context. Prepared
for Presentation as the European Union Studies Association Eighth Biennial International Conference,
Nashville, TN, March 27-29, 2003.
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commerce. The EU’s power has set a new precedent, exporting “Europeanization” through the
globe.
In order to address the question of the EU as a soft-power and climate change leader,
understanding the internal dynamics is crucial. I will conduct a comparison of two EU members
in order to gauge its effectiveness. For this paper, Sweden and Ireland will be reviewed within
the framework of four determinants that I will outline. Both countries are among the wealthiest
countries in the union with GDPs of USD $530,883,869.0014 and USD $388,698,711.35 (most
recent value in thousands),15 respectively. While they are economically stable, they have very
different records on climate change. Each has acknowledged there is a climate emergency and
espouse their commitment to mitigation work. Sweden is often held up as a prime example of
successful commitment to climate change while Ireland is frequently referred to as a laggard.
How can two seemingly similar member states have such different performance on climate
change if the EU is a strong leader?
It is the argument of this thesis that the answer to the question may be found in the
presence of four internal, domestic factors which will be discussed in the next chapter:
1. Informed Public (supportive of climate change mitigation)
2. Consensus
3. Oversight
4. Challenges
Overall, the EU faces the daunting task of GHG reductions in relation to its commitment
to the 2030 SDGs as well as the 2050 net-zero emissions goal. However, the EU is not alone in

14
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this challenge. A German environmental monitoring organization has created a standardized
measurement index to rank the climate performance of fifty-seven countries, including the EU.
The Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) cooperates with multinational activist networks
Climate Action Network (CAN), GermanWatch and the New Climate Institute to produce an
annual report for the UN. These detailed reports also rely on input from climate change think
tanks, universities and networks within each country. Together they have created a weighted
measurement system to track GHGs, climate policy, energy use and renewable energy. GHGs
are the primary area, weighted at 40%. The other three are weighted at 20% each, indicating the
prioritization of GHGs due to how they affect all areas of climate change. The CCPI 2019 report
states that “More than half of the CCPI ranking indicators are qualified on relative terms
(better/worse) rather than absolute.”16
The discussions around climate change goals generally mean reduction of GHGs by way
of ending reliance on fossil fuels and decarbonization. Cutting these emissions is necessary to
keep the planet’s temperature from rising above 2 degrees Celsius, though the current benchmark
is now 1.5 degrees. The 2015 Paris Agreement set environmental benchmarks as a form of
Oversight. They are metrics to assess and implement mitigation and adaptation work. Should
the planet’s core temperature rise above those marks it will wreak catastrophic damage
throughout the globe. No country will be immune. There will be extreme weather patterns,
flooding, food shortages and destabilization of security. The risk is grave enough to require
sweeping changes because incremental actions are not enough to make the necessary impact at
this point. The CCPI report shows that the EU and the rest of the world are still playing a game
of catch up.

16
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While those projections can be discouraging, the organization had a bit of encouraging
news. It noted that in 2017 renewable power generation capacity increased (mainly through
solar) more than nuclear gas and coal combined.17 Decarbonization seems to have gained
traction however carbon emissions are increasing again, presenting us with a clear example of
why incremental policies will not produce the necessary reductions. Major, multilateral efforts
and cooperation must take place in order for these countries and the rest of the EU to
demonstrate its effectiveness as an actor.
Climate change is a twenty-first century challenge. The old theories and definitions are
still evolving. However, the EU is the only organizational body in the region with the authority
to act on behalf of all its members. Understanding the building blocks of actorness may help
shed light on weaknesses and strengths and give rise to new theories on how the Union can
improve in its efforts to govern across all levels.

17
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Chapter III - The Argument and Research Design
As an IO, the EU is often discussed as representing the Constructivist/Liberal criteria of
cooperation between its member states discussed in the previous chapter - a collaborative,
persuasive directional leadership that leads by example rather than military or economic coercion
- a leadiator. What are the internal conditions that ultimately serve as qualifying factors for
member states to cooperate with EU climate policies? As a multilevel system of government
there is plenty of opportunity for both success and failure within the EU, as exhibited by these
two countries. I have outlined the four criteria of actorness because regional and local system’s
implementation of policy and rules affects the EU’s reputation and vice versa. It is a symbiotic,
even co-dependent relationship. Cooperation between states and the EU in these areas are key to
the EU’s ability to change norms, beliefs and policies.
The four determinants I have identified, 1) Informed Public, 2) Consensus, 3) Oversight
and 4) Challenges apply to the EU as well as Sweden and Ireland. These two countries were
selected because of their similarities and differences. Sweden consistently ranks in the top five
while Ireland is among the bottom on climate change. The former is known as a climate leader
and the latter is often referred to as a laggard. They share comparable education levels and
economies, which should indicate an ability to grasp the urgency of climate change work and
render them stable enough to bear mitigation and adaptation costs. But their climate change
records could not be more dissimilar.
The last determinant, Challenges, reveals their shared difficulty in coherence with overall
EU climate change policies and goals. These two states demonstrate the logic of the Most
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Different Systems Design18 in that they are more dissimilar than they are alike. The economic
consequences of radical policy change renders them vulnerable to political incrementalism. The
four determining points I have outlined are therefore, all relevant variables in determining the
degree of compliance between the EU and these two member states on climate work.
Examination of the levels of incorporation with EU policy will help clarify the organization’s
actorness on climate change.
This qualitative research, though limited to a small case study/comparison, is intended to
open a broader conversation (and broader research) into more successful cohesion and coherence
with EU environmental policy. The research was gathered in order to gain insight into the
explanatory and prescriptive questions around the EU!s actorness. A broader study is required to
gain deeper understanding of the context of each state!s climate change response. Illumination of
these internal conditions are necessary to ascertain the cause-effect relationship. More
importantly, it may reveal new insight into how the EU might address and improve where
climate work is lacking and buttress successful efforts. Either option provides room for the EU
to enhance its actor status. The EU is the only actor in the region with the capacity to act,
making its success imperative. Understanding the context within which its members behave
plays an important role in how the EU should address its partnership with these members.
The research for this thesis consists of a qualitative comparison/case study of Ireland and
Sweden against the EU. These two countries were selected on the basis of their shared Northern
European culture, the similarity of their economic strength, relatively small populations and most
importantly, their contradictory environmental performance records. It would be easy to assume

18
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these countries would have closer if not corresponding records. However, examination of
internal conditions reveals why their performances are so unlike the other!s. The qualitative
research is based on the work of current IR theorists and scholars, who have authored works on
actorness, the actorness of the EU, climate change adaptation and mitigation work data for the
EU, Ireland and Sweden. It has also drawn upon the work of IOs, governments and NGOs.
Returning to the four internal determinants, it is important to present how they are rooted
in IR theory and their relevance to the actorness of the EU. The first two points speak to the
coordination of multilevel governance and power of international activist networks. These
elements are crucial because they reflect the EU’s ability to shape norms, values and ultimately,
policies surrounding climate change. They are part of the conversation(s) around
interdependence and cooperation among self-interested actors in shaping the national discussions
around climate change. Regarding the second point, “Consensus,” or solidarity of opinion, led
by the EU (top-down leadership) would be a clear indicator of the EU!s actorness, of structural
and entrepreneurial power (Wurzel et al., 2003-2009).
An “Informed Public” is a cornerstone of democracy. When the public are informed it is
assumed they have been presented with and hopefully, understand the facts surrounding an issue.
Comprehension of facts are what should inform the public’s opinions and beliefs in a simple,
straightforward world. Reality is far more complicated and when an issue is as deeply driven by
science as climate change is, it becomes far more complicated and nuanced. The science around
climate change is never static. As such, its fluidity can often make it difficult for the nonscientist to fully understand this existential threat to the environment. However, most EU
citizens are aware of the urgency and the risks posed by climate change. According to a 2019
EU survey titled “Citizen Support for Climate Action,” 93% of Europeans consider climate

19

change to be a “serious problem” and 79% understand it is a “serious problem.”19 This indicates
that EU citizens for the most part, are aware of the damage that is possible if they do not change
course. They are also in agreement that something must be done (Consensus) even if they don’t
always agree on specific policies and laws. According to that same survey, 92% of respondents
“think it is important their national government sets ambitious targets to increase the amount of
renewable energy used and 89% believe governments should provide support for improving
energy efficiency by 2030.”20
There are approximately 446 million people living in the EU.21 Aside from the obvious
influence of the press and social media, there are other powerful forces at work which have
helped create an Informed Public within such a populous and diverse region. Activist networks
in particular, have been highly effective in driving awareness and informing the public of the
danger posed by climate change. The evolution of activist networks seems to imply a causal
relationship with climate change awareness. For that reason, activist
networks/organizations/associations must be acknowledged for their ability to increase
awareness around an issue. There can be no doubt that the support of an Informed Public has
been an asset in the EU’s pursuit of climate change mitigation work. An Informed Public
supports the EU’s mission - at least in theory. When asking what may have driven the citizenry
to accept or acknowledge the need for this adaptation, activist networks have had a large part in
that work.

19
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An Informed Public means the citizenry are aware of the facts or in this case, the science
of climate change, and their opinions are shaped by the sharing of that information. The idea of
activist networks is not new. Over the course of the last century the idea of them has taken hold,
resulting in a proliferation of networks. The Climate Action Network is but one example,
representing approximately 1,500 civil society organizations, throughout 130 countries.22 Keck
and Sikkink (1998) broadly describe these types of activist networks as being twofold. In part,
there are networks of scientists and experts, with shared ideas and ties used to influence policy, is
also known as the epistemic community. The second group, transnational advocacy networks,
are usually advocates impelled by shared or similar principles and ideas.23 The epistemic
community drives policy from a knowledge-based approach and activist networks share values.
These value-driven networks are then able to influence norms when successful. Clearly, they
have been successful enough to influence public opinion and drive the EU to legislate legal
accountability on climate change.
“Consensus” is typically used to convey an agreement or unanimity of opinion on a
particular topic. It is a main tool of leverage for initiating change or maintaining status quo. For
an actor to advance its position without Consensus might be compared to Sisyphus pushing a
boulder up a mountain. An actor such as the EU represents twenty-seven member states, so it
follows that diversity of opinion is par for the course. Consensus, however, serves to unite and
therefore can enhance a position as well as power and effectiveness. Without Consensus, there is
no momentum. Current developments in the EU regarding climate change indicate momentum is
there to support GHG reductions in order fight an existential threat.

22
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The EU is aggressively pursuing a leadership role on climate change. It has employed
vast resources and influence in order to accomplish the new precedent legally binding climate
change targets. Despite the many vertical and horizontal levels/factions within the organization
it has managed to attain a level of directional leadership which would have been impossible
without Consensus. Drastic reductions such as 55% are challenging for any actor to achieve but
multilevel collaboration and cooperation have enabled the EU to realize its power as an actor.
Some authors, such as Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007) argue its decentralized governance
is actually what provides an advantage in the ability to act in an entrepreneurial capacity when
setting goals and targets. This could be interpreted as a form of structural power. The ability of
the EU to develop a set of priorities and goals within a diverse environment therefore indicates
structural capability of the organization. Consensus drives and empowers the EU to enact the
new climate change law.
Coherence of opinion though, does not translate into identical performance from each
member, leading critics to dispute the EU’s capability as an actor. Each country within the EU
has its own record on the environment. EU detractors may consider its actorness as diminished
or enhanced by the performance records of those states. This may not be an accurate gauge
though. As with any multilateral organization, each member comes with its own set of strengths,
weaknesses and conditions. Consensus or unanimity means each member state, while in
agreement with the agreement with the EU, may have wildly varying environmental performance
records. For example, Sweden and Ireland have very different environmental records despite a
Consensus on the issue of climate change. Both have been vocal concerning their dedication to
GHG reductions although Sweden’s performance is among the top for the region and Ireland’s is
nearly at the bottom. According to the Climate Change Performance Index 2021 (CCPI),
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Sweden ranks #4 and Ireland at 39, among the lowest in the EU.24 They have very different
internal conditions and performance records and yet still have signed on to the EU’s climate
change agenda laws. Inarguably, Consensus at the state level, imperfect as it may be, has
contributed to the organization’s capacity as an actor.
“Oversight” is the third characteristic. It generally refers to supervision: who determines
and influences governance? What is the causal variance for incorporation of climate change
policy? Essentially, this is about Top-Down or Bottom-Up influence, meaning regional versus
national and local governance. What internal conditions set the stage for local and national
institutionalization of EU policy, if any?
Oversight is outlined by regulatory and/or legal procedures and goals to be achieved. Its
main purpose is to monitor, review and analyze coherence with practice, policy or law. In a
democratic society it is typically a cooperative effort on the part of the public, government and to
some degree, business. It is designed to ensure success or coherence of a project or enterprise.
Without it, projects can go awry. The EU, as a multilayered, multilevel organization brings a
wealth of diverse opinions and complexity to the Oversight process. When tasked with
Oversight of a particular endeavor such as climate change it is faced with a massive challenge.
Each member maintains different internal conditions, concerns and abilities. Therefore, when
the organization sets about creating or structuring Oversight on an issue, it is not a simple task
because unity is an essential determinant. A basic level of standards must be agreed upon in
order to define the metrics. Without skillful, nuanced negotiation, Consensus and therefore
Oversight cannot be achieved.
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It can be argued the EU has achieved the level of structural power to be considered a
successful actor. Despite the diversity and opportunity for disunity within the EU, Oversight on
climate change at the very least has been defined and delegated. As a consultative effort, the
organization has sought the input of external, expert organizations such as the UN,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and others to come up with a coherent
policy. As of April 21st, 2021, these goals were codified into law, which will absolutely require
Oversight to measure implementation and progress.
As additional evidence of structural and perhaps even entrepreneurial power, climate
change has become a highly prioritized area of the EU’s Cohesion Policy. Climate change is an
economic threat because it is a menace to security and stability - extending beyond the realm of
just being an environmental issue. Budgets must be created and dedicated to avoiding these
threats. The latest example of this prioritization is outlined in a study requested by the EP’s
Committee on Regional Development (REGI), published in March 2021. This study examined
EU Cohesion Policy support of Climate Policy and how that can be expanded. The former is
focused on the economic stability and unity of the region, concerning budgets and allocations.
The latter is now considered to fall under the umbrella of economic unity and stability for the
region. This is significant because it demonstrates the EU has accepted the idea that climate
change is an existential and economic threat that requires action. Once budgets and finances are
concerned, Oversight becomes an innate part of the process.
The EU exists as a whole, composed of many, disparate states. It has managed to
incorporate climate change work into its main investment policy, demonstrating again its
intentions, minimizing risks and leading a united region. The import of its incorporation into the
Cohesion Policy should not be overlooked. As an organization, the EU is taking genuine,
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quantifiable action. Each member brings its own set of internal conditions that may or may not
match its ambitions - to unite the EU in moving the region forward, into a position of unity and
influence. Ireland and Sweden are prime examples of such.
The last category is “Challenges.” Neither Sweden nor Ireland are currently on track to
meet the EU’s emissions goals. By comparing internal conditions I hope to identify if/how there
are any similarities or dissimilarities affecting their individual performance and impact on the
Union as a whole. I will present empirical data relating to all four criteria, demonstrating their
impact or not on the EU’s ability to be an international leader on climate change.
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Chapter IV - Case Studies
1.1 Informed Public - Ireland
Activist networks play no small part in getting the data and information into the hands
(and heads) of the public. The Irish Environmental Network (IEN) is one example of an activist
network. It serves as an umbrella organization that works to support and raise awareness of the
many diverse environmental NGOs in Ireland. According to the IEN’s website, they help these
organizations coordinate and leverage themselves to “create and promote policies that advance
sustainability and to provide a channel for government and other social partners to engage with
the environmental sector on policy matters.”25 They direct these networks to funding, support,
and promote lobbying efforts in order to raise public awareness of the necessity for preservation
and conservation. Their work enables advocacy organizations to coalesce in order to boost their
voices and agendas and apply pressure strategically on local and state government policies.
They coordinate to promote knowledge of these networks, strengthening public support.
Momentum is effectively built with this approach because it appeals to people!s values and
shapes norms around climate change26 in Ireland, as will be discussed further in the next section.
Advocacy networks have shaped the public’s opinions enough to have created policy
forums - climate change policy is no longer strictly the domain of the scientific community nor
the political elite. However, the elections of 2016 and 2020 brought the Green Party to the
government with two seats followed by four seats, respectively. Climate change advocates now
have a national platform to share information with the general public. And they have seized the
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opportunity to do so. Advocacy networks have reached government level, using this opportunity
to continue moving forward with the Green Party as a vehicle.
The Green Party’s plan (2020) is to work across the Dáil to reach all parties and achieve
the 2030 and 2050 EU goals. Additionally, the 2020 Manifesto pledges to listen to “local
voices” and carry out policies that are specific to the needs of the local communities. The party
further asserts that climate change response and legislation must be informed by local
communities as well as from the government. A multilevel plan such as this is greatly enhanced
by an Informed Public. Climate change work done by networks, lobbyists and governmental
parties are far better positioned for success with an Informed Public, if they are to accomplish
national and EU goals.
Policy forums, both formal and informal are intended to provide an educational platform
for sharing information and views. The assumption regarding policy forums is that they
facilitate the sharing of information and data that shape policy. Moreover, bigger forums provide
more diversity of data necessary for learning that will inform policy decisions. However, some
argue they can be susceptible to the “echo chamber effect,” when similar views and beliefs
reinforce each other’s. Wagner and Ylä-Anttila (2020) state that in Ireland there is a lack of
diversity of opinion among policy forums. They question 1) if actors in the Irish network are
influenced more by those with similar beliefs and 2) if actors actually learn anything differing
beliefs that are shared by others at policy forums. Their article studies the relationship between
“the information-seeking”27 behavior of actors, their beliefs and if the information shared by
these actors at forums is acquired by organizations. They eventually come to the conclusion that
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policy advice in Ireland is not obtained from other actors and that the forums organized are
neither inclusive nor effective at encouraging policy learning. Their research results show that
the heterogeneity of actor groups such as government, private sector and civil society makes
each less likely to conjoin outside their own groups.28 While this may be significant, it has not
had a negative effect on Informed Public in terms of acceptance and necessity of climate change
adaptation measures in Ireland.
1.2 Informed Public - Sweden
Sweden is a solid performer on climate change, consistently ranking among the top in the
EU. Its policies can even be considered somewhat of a model for the region. One could say that
Sweden is a notable example of the EU’s success as an actor. This is partially accurate because
of the codependent nature of this relationship. Indeed, Sweden’s climate change record
represents the EU’s ambitions to be a model of environmental work. Sweden is aware of and
committed to upholding the EU’s GHG reduction goals. According to the Swedish Ministry of
Environment, “a number of policy instruments at EU level, including emission standards for
vehicles and emissions trading are very important to Sweden!s possibility to meet its own
national targets.”29 Sweden and Ireland though, with seemingly similar internal conditions such
as an educated public, high degrees of economic development and well-developed institutions
(Sarasini, 2009) have vastly different records. This is surprising because both countries are
ardent supporters of climate change work. Sweden may have the advantage edge here because
awareness is very much institutionalized, therefore supporting potential for environmental
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literacy.30 It is committed to the EU’s targets in a way that Ireland is not. Sarasini states that
climate success requires “pioneers” with the above listed attributes and EU membership provides
the benefit of a platform to expound and export policy innovations. This is true in the case of
Sweden, which has been upfront about its desire to be a world leader on climate change.
As far back as the 1950s Sweden was a supporter of environmental protection and
preservation, a “pioneer” by Sarasini’s standards. The scientific (epistemic) and political
communities were able to successfully communicate in order to gain public support for new
policies. But an activist network can be credited as the original pioneer of environmental
awareness in Sweden. The Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (Naturskyddsföreningen)
was established at the beginning of the twentieth century and currently has close to 200,000
members.31 This organization’s original mission was to preserve land and wildlife but over the
years it has grown into the leading advocacy organization in the country. It encourages the
public to experience nature in order to understand the need to protect it. It has also been a leader
in Sweden, involved in nearly every area of environmental work from housing, transport and
manufacturing. Its efforts to create an Informed Public have an extensive reach. In Sweden we
see an example of what Keck and Sikkink discussed in how norms, values and beliefs are shaped
by activist networks, then applied to policies.
The Society’s reach is both domestic and international; having helped established
governmental agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and partnering with 40
organizations in 10 countries.32 Therefore, it is no surprise that Sweden’s history on the
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environment is longer than most others. This history implies success on the part of advocacy
networks in shaping an Informed Public. Activist networks here have defined norms and beliefs,
providing a platform for policy work to be accepted.
None of this should be read as Sweden representing an environmental utopia. Overall,
there is an Informed Public that supports environmental work at the local and EU level. In the
case of Sweden, it could be said that knowledge and awareness have been institutionalized, as
argued by Nilsson et al. (2012). While it does have a stellar record, multilevel governance is a
labyrinth of various interests and groups. In addition to the challenge of multilevel governance is
the reconciliation of science and policy.
Science is perpetually playing a game of catch up with nature on climate change. While
one might assume that policy makers and an Informed Public would make rational decisions
driven by science, that is not always the case. Swedish scholar Åsa Knaggard (2012) contends
that if the science is uncertain or not framed in a way that is politically accessible, it makes
politicians uncomfortable.33 Rationalism is then replaced by incrementalism. With that in mind,
she posits that Swedish policy makers have chosen incrementalism. Although Swedish policy
makers may handle scientific uncertainty with incrementalism, as she contends, this indicates
that policy is affected but that does not seem translate into diminished awareness on the part of
the public. The public remains informed and engaged, as demonstrated by its performance
record and support for EU level policies.
It can be said that Sweden was better positioned for the work of adaptation and mitigation
than Ireland, despite their surface similarities. With advocacy networks, a scientific community
and political elite all exerting their influence to inform the public, there was already a pre33
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existing condition that was unique to Sweden known as "Allemansrätt.” It means a freedom to
roam and will be discussed in further detail in the next section. Allemansrätt set a kind of
national norm for respecting and appreciating the environment. This is a valuable factor in
establishing a citizenry that is receptive and supportive of climate change information and
efforts. An Informed Public that values nature and the environment supports the work that must
be done to protect it, therefore enhancing the state and the EU’s actorness.
Informed Public feeds into the next criterion of actorness, which is Consensus. In some
respect it can be challenging not to conflate the two. Both are based on the idea of sharing
information, but Consensus relies upon unanimity. An Informed Public, shaped by activist
networks can abolish or reinforce prior beliefs and redefine new ones, presenting a framework
from which Consensus can then be built.
2.1 Consensus - Ireland
Ireland is frequently referred to as a climate “laggard.” The 2019, the CCPI ranked
Ireland’s performance as #48 out of fifty-eight countries.34 (Sweden held the top spot though it
must be noted that none of these countries has actually met the benchmarks necessary to avoid a
two-degree Celsius temperature increase.) The CCPI 2019 report goes on to state that Ireland
has the worst performance record within the EU. By the time the CCPI’s 2021 report was
published, Ireland had progressed to #39 out of 61. This shows an improvement however the
report notes again that no single country or region is on track to meet the necessary GHG
reduction goals.
Typically, it has been assumed that Ireland’s poor performance stems from a lack of
political will and an uninformed citizenry. Yet in 2018 the Irish Parliament passed the Fossil
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Fuel Divestment Act. This act instructed the Ireland Strategic Investment Fund to remove its
assets from fossil fuel companies within five years.35 Prior to this was the formation of the Irish
Citizen’s Assembly, indicating a degree of political will to explore what proved to be an
informed citizenry. Ireland deserves recognition for these two acts, for it is addressing climate
change on a fiscal and popular level. It must also be acknowledged there is some pushback
among Irish citizens and members of the political elite. They argue that Ireland’s small footprint
relative to the EU does not require drastic GHG reduction measures for Ireland accounts for
approximately 1.7% of the EU’s GHGs.36 Despite such semantic, political protests, Ireland has
acknowledged the threat of climate change. It was one of the first countries in the EU to declare
a climate state of emergency in 2019, therefore awareness and urgency cannot be disputed. The
country appears willing to comply with EU policies, even if somewhat begrudgingly.
With regard to awareness and informed citizenry, in the 2020 elections the Green Party
won four seats in the government. They promptly set about advocating on behalf of and
prioritizing climate change work. On April 21st, 2021, the same day the EU announced the new
climate law, the Green Party announced it was bringing its own bill before the Dáil, the lower
house of the legislature. Green Party Leader, Eamon Ryan communicated the party’s enthusiasm
and support for achieving net zero emissions by 2050.37 The bill would require Ireland to reduce
emissions by 51% (slightly less than the EU’s target) and carbon budgets to comply with the
Paris Agreement. Ireland appears to be working in tandem with the EU, to support their mutual
goals. However, its performance to date demonstrates that ambition does not always equal
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results. This cannot be understood as a failure on the EU’s part for internal conditions play a
role as well.
Despite its grim environmental record, Ireland has endeavored to fight climate change
with efforts such as the above mentioned, Fossil Fuel Divestment Bill and the Irish Citizen’s
Assembly. The former was a commitment to divest public funds from coal, oil and gas
companies, a first for any country.38 Ireland acknowledged the necessity of divesting its USD
$10.4 billion Strategic Investment Fund from fossil fuels in order to address GHG emissions and
to improve its laggard status. Thomas Pringle, the independent member of Parliament who
introduced the bill is quoted as saying "This bill we are leading the way at state level ... but we
are lagging seriously behind on our EU and international climate commitments,”39. The Irish
government was in sync with the EU’s overall prioritization of GHG reductions and as Pringle
acknowledged, it was attempting to improve the internal conditions that contributed to its status
as a laggard.
While Consensus was taking shape among the Irish political elite, it was also taking hold
among the Irish public. The Green Party was originally elected in 2016, winning two seats. This
was followed by the formation of the Irish Citizen!s Assembly and the Green Party succeeded in
getting climate change on the agenda. The Assembly featured 99 citizens randomly selected to
represent a diverse sample of the Irish public, from all backgrounds. As a forum it was created
to obtain the public’s input on five different areas of societal reform. As the Green Party was
now in government, climate change was prioritized. The Irish Citizen’s Assembly was asked for
recommendations as to how the country could reform its environmental work.
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As noted by Devaney, Brererton et al. (2020), it was assumed that as a climate laggard,
there would be a low level of environmental literacy among the group, yet these citizens proved
to be more aware and engaged than expected. Overall, Devaney, Brereton et al. learned this
“mini-public” felt Ireland’s response to climate change was lacking. The authors believe this
suggests there is a mutual, causal relationship between the state (Ireland) and the actor’s (EU)
prioritization resulting in Consensus. The Irish Citizen!s Assembly!s level of literacy challenged
the authors’ assumption but their input and recommendations demonstrated Consensus with the
EU.
The authors were also surprised by the level of literacy given the lack of media coverage.
The paucity of climate change coverage in the Irish press is an important internal condition has
as much influence in framing or frameworks as do public opinion and the political elite. In this
case the EU and Ireland directly or indirectly achieved a level of Consensus despite the Irish
press. Irish media engagement on climate issues was examined by Wagner and Payne (2017)
and was determined to have a major influence on awareness of an issue. These authors also
discovered that newspaper climate change coverage between 1997 until about 2007 steadily rose
then peaked until 2009.40 They attribute the decline to a realization of the astronomical costs
associated with adaptation work and the more pressing global recession.41 Media/press have the
power to define problems, highlight causal relationships and present potential solutions.
Depending upon how issues are framed, media can affect public policy responses and have
substantial impact on how Consensus is reached. Wagner and Payne made clear that the
responsibility of newspapers was to present themselves as “observers of reality,” with
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impartiality/objectivity being the cornerstone of their work. Balance in journalism, according to
them, was the most ideal approach. They go on to assure that scientific issues are complicated to
cover as they require more knowledge not the part of journalists. Therefore, they tend to present
the views of spokespersons from a both-sides perspective, sometimes confusing facts with
personal opinions. For obvious reasons, all of this has the potential for deeply impacting
Consensus.
2.2 Consensus - Sweden
Sweden provides another example of Consensus with the EU on climate change despite
its environmental performance record being on the opposite end of the spectrum to Ireland.
These two countries share some similarities that would imply a causal relationship between
wealth/means, education level and capabilities. Unfortunately, this is not the case. To that end,
a closer look at the internal conditions reveals how Sweden may have had a pre-existing
advantage, enabling incorporation of EU policy and law. In the case of Sweden, it can even be
said it is a leading example of policy cohesion with the EU. Internal conditions however, created
an environment that enabled Consensus.
Historically, Sweden has a successful track record on environmental work. Until the
1950s, Sweden relied on hydropower then pivoted to more environmentally friendly power
sources in order to protect the environment. In the1960s, it began work on reducing fossil fuel
reliance. During the period of 1970 to 1990, it succeeded in lowering carbon emissions by as
much as half.42 This successful climate change mitigation and adaptation was initially driven by
the concern to protect rivers that had not been dammed to support hydropower plants.43 Sweden
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then turned mainly to nuclear energy in order to reduce dependance on fossil fuels. Later, the oil
crisis of the 1970s further buoyed the momentum to reduce that reliance.
Eventually Sweden introduced the household carbon tax which is essentially a fee for
carbon pollution44. They adopted this at a point when carbon taxes had not been widely
embraced by other countries. Subsequently, the EU introduced the ETS in 2015, a system
designed to reduce carbon pollution and GHGs by establishing a trading system. The ETS
applies to industry rather than individual households so in that respect it differs from the Swedish
household carbon tax. Nevertheless, in general it demonstrates overall synchronicity, setting the
foundation for Consensus. Sweden and the EU recognize that dependance on fossil fuels must
be reduced and both have been employing generally similar tools to manage and reduce GHGs.
These early efforts in Sweden established the conditions for Consensus well before the
EU ever announced its ambitions as an actor on climate change. Sweden long ago adopted
successful measures that took hold and influenced governance on a complex issue, setting the
stage for coherence and Consensus. Once the EU became a vocal actor on this issue, there was a
built-in, predetermined level of Consensus with Sweden. In general, the Nordic countries have a
progressive record on climate change and Sweden is a top performer on this work among those
countries.45
Scientific evidence began to reveal the effects of climate change during the latter half of
the twentieth century. Sweden took heed of the threat posed by GHGs and it became a political
issue in the 1970s. The data indicated worrying trends and the citizenry was for the most part,
literate enough to understand the threat, providing popular support for government action.

44

Ibid.
Climate Change Performance Index, 2021. Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland ranked at #4, #6,
#8 and #11 respectively.
45

36

Whether or not this was by design, it dovetailed with the EU!s developing/future plans. The
Swedish philosophy of Allemansrätt, “Freedom to Roam,”46 is one example of a sort of precondition for Consensus with a cooperative public. Allemansrätt bestows the right to every man
and woman to access public lands. It has been codified in the Swedish Constitution since 1994.
Swedish norms place value on the right of access to nature and the preservation of it. With
Allemansrätt the government officially legislated the right of access to all public lands, barring
private gardens near a dwelling or house. Nature is to be experienced by all, representing a very
powerful value and norm that has become law.
This does not mean to say the science around climate change is somehow simpler and
easier to understand in Sweden than in Ireland. As mentioned earlier, the science around climate
change is complex and fraught with uncertainties. Environmental literacy or compliance among
the public is in large part, driven by the press/media. In the case of Sweden, there is an overall
acceptance of the need to protect the environment as a pre-condition. This does not imply that
climate change policies go unchallenged or without opposition. Policy makers must make
rational decisions that are highly specific. In a perfect world those decisions are informed by
absolute, scientific data, implemented by perfectly targeted policies and with minimal disruption.
The reality is that policy makers have to deal with scientific uncertainty informing their
decisions. This is where incrementalism begins to inform policy. Åsa Knaggard (2014)
discusses how incrementalism affects Sweden’s climate change affairs. While one might assume
that policy makers should make rational decisions, informed by science, that is not always the
case. Science is perpetually playing a game of catch up with nature. Policy must be palatable to
the public. Knaggard contends that if the science is uncertain and not framed in a way that is
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politically accessible, it makes politicians uncomfortable.47 Rationalism is replaced with
incrementalism. With that in mind, she posits that Swedish climate change policy makers have
chosen incrementalism.
Despite all of that, Sweden is still an excellent example Consensus. By and large, the
political elite and the public generally are in agreement with the EU’s goals, intentionally or not.
The Swedish track record of environmental work provided a framework for Consensus,
enhancing the EU’s actorness. Sweden sets a standard for supporting the EU’s climate change
goals. A normative and legal Consensus here strengthens the EU’s actorness on the international
stage and within the region. They have accentuated the value of mutual Consensus on a
multilateral, bilateral and local level. Both entities exercise shared commitment to the
environment, a peaceful union and the UN!s 2030 Sustainable Goals.
It must be mentioned that many critics such as Bretherton and Niemann (2013) are quick
to point out the EU long ago failed to emerge as an international leader after the perceived failure
of the 2009 Copenhagen United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). This is a short-sighted opinion. The EU certainly made some tactical mistakes
during the Copenhagen Convention and may well continue to do so, but global conditions also
played a crucial role at that time. In 2009, the world was in the midst of a global recession and
the science had not quite yet encouraged the current level of urgency. Internal conditions
therefore impacted priorities, affecting climate change work in the short-term. Clearly, the EU
has since intensified its focus, culminating in the April 2021 announcement. As they are inclined
to do, nature and science continue to develop, and the EU re-prioritized its efforts once the global

47

Knaggard, Å. What do Policy Makers Do with Scientific Uncertainty? The Incremental Character of
Swedish Climate Change Policy-Making. Policy Studies. 2014.

38

recession was over. Research and statistics guided the EU on its ambitions. With a clearer
picture of its own, internal ability to effect change, the EU holds strong in its efforts to exert
influence on the international stage, as actor.
3.1 Oversight - Ireland
Ireland has generally succeeded in creating an Informed Public and Consensus on climate
change. There is an overall sense of awareness among the public and the government regarding
the implications and risk posed by failing to act. Yet still, Oversight struggles to produce
successful results in Ireland. It has had some small successes such as a 4.5% decrease in GHG
emissions in 201948 but modest victories such as this are not enough in aggregate, to improve its
climate change record. Oversight seems not to have its intended effect of measuring and
improving compliance. Ireland’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) admits it will fail to
meet internal and EU climate change benchmarks on the 2030 SDGs and net-zero emissions by
2050. At this point, Ireland is on track to remain at the bottom of the list, perpetuating its
laggard status. The conditions that were successful in creating an Informed Public and
Consensus seem to be missing the mark when it comes to effective Oversight. Without action,
the metrics and conditions to assess, review and implement policy are ineffectual and Ireland
cannot be considered a successful actor. To some, this can be interpreted as a rejection of the
EU’s frameworks, perhaps even a rejection of Europeanization itself.
In reality, Ireland is not quite rejecting the EU. Torney and O’Gorman (2019) maintain it
is in fact, a strong supporter of the union. Though they admit there seems to be a bit of a
“transactional element” to Irish membership meaning they have been reluctant to cede powers on
environmental issues. The EU has taken Ireland to court for non-compliance on various
48
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environmental policies.49 The takeaway here is that Oversight is complicated both internally and
with the EU.
Activist networks have played a vital role in creating the conditions for Informed Public
and Consensus. Following that train of thought, there is no reason to doubt their input would
have any less impact on Oversight. There is no shortage of activist networks in Ireland. The
Irish Environmental Network (IEN) boasts 35,000 members who volunteer to work across a wide
range of organizations covering all things related to biodiversity, climate and environment.50
Their input however does not seem to have been able to produce agreement and partnership with
the government to enforce meaningful measures - either a disregard or failure of Oversight. The
global recession that began in 2008 did not help climate work. Ireland was one of the EU
members hardest hit by the global recession in 2008, relegating climate change coverage way
down the priority list.
When compared to a member like Sweden, the recession exposed the weaknesses of
Ireland’s society safety net. The ripple effect of that recession was felt more profoundly and for
a longer amount of time in Ireland. Therefore, reluctance on the part of the government to enact
new policies that may upset the newly achieved status quo is risky. New Oversight regulations
on climate change might present risks displeasing to voters and the business community. Torney
and O’Gorman’s article further notes that during the recession years of 2008-2011 there was a
15% reduction of GHGs. This was good news but still not enough to positively impact its
overall performance. With the help of the International Monetary Fund and the EU, Ireland
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recovered from the 2008 recession.51 Subsequently, emissions increased. If one were to
interpret this as a causal relationship as many do, it could spell political and economic suicide,
making Oversight determinations and compliance with them all the more difficult. Economic
uncertainty blunts political will.
This does not mean to imply there is no Oversight in Ireland, but rather that existing
Oversight lacks the impetus to be considered a genuine source for change. The Irish EPA has
taken the step of establishing a Climate Research Coordination Group (CRCG) to harmonize
research and funding for climate-related topics for the years 2014-2020.52 It has been directed to
act as a go-between local authorities and other government agencies. The government has spent
€25 million on over 220 research projects through this program.53 The research being conducted
contributes to Oversight in terms of assessment and projections.
Oversight may not be aggressive or effective, but recent political developments bring
hope for improvement. The elections of 2016 and 2020 saw the addition of the Green Party to
the government. This environmentally focused party describes itself as a progressive, “focused
on a sustainable future” and asserts its movement is growing54. Indeed, it has increased its
number of seats in the government and hopefully will be able to implement actions to correct
Ireland’s course, but it is too soon to determine. The Irish Times’ Environment and Science
Editor succinctly summed up Ireland’s record and Oversight with “The gross failures are
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manifest in inaction, an inability to deliver on commitments and a lack of enforcement.”55 The
Green Party must work to bridge the gap between Oversight and implementation as well as
coherence to EU policy and law.
Ireland appears to have the means for climate change mitigation and adaptation but seems
to lack the political will. The EU now has a choice - either move forward without them or
increase pressure to ensure cohesion and capacity. In order to make that decision the Union will
have to determine how much of its own reputation is at stake and whether its best interests lie in
working with other, poor-performing members.
3.2 Oversight - Sweden
Sweden may have an advantage on climate issues, for reasons such as those outlined in
the sections on Informed Public and Consensus. During the 1950s Sweden had begun to move
away from fossil fuel dependency. By 1967, it was the first country to pass an environmental
act, positioning itself as a climate change actor. The 1972 UN Conference on the Environment
in Stockholm was the first meeting of its kind to prioritize the environment56, further establishing
Sweden’s actorness. This conference included the Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan for
the Human Environment which essentially provided a form of Oversight. The plan initiated a
dialog between developed and developing countries, involving both local and
regional/international levels. It made suggestions for assessment and management.
Collaboration with the UN on all aspects of these recommendations became requisite. This was
a huge international development. Consciously or not, Sweden laid a foundation for
collaborative Oversight work between the EU and other organizations such as the UN.
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Since then, Sweden has developed Oversight on climate change through several efforts.
As previously mentioned, the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) was initially an
organization that advocated for people to become more connected to nature and the environment
in order to encourage conservation and preservation. Through its work it has fostered an
Informed Public that has managed to strengthen Consensus on environmental efforts. SSNC has
exercised a fair amount of influence over environmental norms, beliefs and policies in Sweden.
It remains an active organization, partnering with organizations in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin
American and Asia.57 SSNC is an activist network that has contributed to the acuteness of
Sweden within the EU. It has directly and indirectly set the stage for Oversight, the next element
of an effective actor.
Another development from 1967 that speaks to Oversight was the establishment of the
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (Natursvårdsverket). This agency is a major
foundation of environmental Oversight in Sweden. It currently falls under the umbrella of the
Ministry of the Environment (Miljödepartmentet), which was established in 1987. Prior to that
the Ministry of Environment was part of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Swedish EPA is a
governmental and international actor that exercises Oversight by compiling, developing and
implementing government policy related to the environment.58 It also works internationally in
support of the UN!s 2030 Sustainable Development Goal as well as the Paris Agreement.
Currently it partners with 40 organizations in 10 countries, generating an Informed Public with
its extensive reach. The EPA is an excellent example of Oversight due to its involvement with
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research, monitoring and collaboration. It actively participates in the “preparatory
negotiations”59 of the EU on international conventions, exerting its influence on that process and
thereby, contributing to the Oversight process on a regional scale. This further reflects its
commitment to reaching those targets and guiding other countries in doing the same. Oversight
is an inherent part of outlining and pursuing those targets.
According to its website, every year the agency is assigned objectives, goals and budget
allocations by the government to support its work. The Swedish EPA works internally with
around 80 other government agencies to implement the 2030 SDGs. One of the agencies it
works with is Statistics Sweden (SCB), a governmental agency that falls under the Ministry of
Finance. SCB provides official data and statistics to the government on all manner of public
issues from climate change to democracy to financial markets - with a goal of strengthening
Sweden’s actorness on these issues. According to its website, SCB provides Sweden with
“useful and trusted statistics,”60 a rudiment of a rational, democratic government. The statistics
and data it mines contributes to the informed parameters for Oversight guidelines.
With regard to collaborative partnerships on Oversight, Sweden’s EPA works closely
with the UN on monitoring the implementation of the 2030 SDGs agenda. As part of this
continuing work, it participates in a National Voluntary Review to review its own progress. In
2017 its presentation to the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
revealed that while Sweden’s performance was impressive, there were some significant
challenges. Sweden thus began to work more closely with the SCB to monitor statistics on its
progress in meeting the 2030 SDGs.
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Another example of the EPA’s actorness regarding Oversight can be found with the
Milestone Targets. These are steps that have been identified by the EPA, across all areas of
environmental work to measure and assess progress towards the national goals. They touch upon
areas such as GHGs, sustainable urban development and biodiversity. When steps are missed,
goals are missed. Therefore, these steps have been created to keep Sweden moving forward in
improving its performance, shoring up its weaknesses and setting an example for the region and
the world.
4. Challenges
Climate change impacts a wide range of environmental areas from GHGs, biodiversity,
water pollution, wildlife preservation and more. These issues do not exist in a vacuum, rather
they are myriad and interrelated, potentially affecting all aspects of our lives. Adaptation and
mitigation efforts require flexibility and cooperation on the part of EU members. As has been
discussed here, Ireland and Sweden have very different records and performance. The previous
three criteria of Informed Public, Consensus and Oversight highlighted the differences between
the two countries. Their internal conditions present various challenges reflected in each one’s
climate change implementation policies and results. Though differences abound, both are
challenged to meet internal goals, impacting the actorness of the EU.
This tends to contradict generalizations about Sweden’s versus Ireland’s environmental
records as discussed above. Ireland!s own scholars, media and activists admit to its laggard
status on climate change while Sweden!s success record might lead some to believe it is a climate
change utopia. The truth is that neither country is perfect and neither of them are on track to
achieve target goals. In the CCPI’s 2019 report Sweden held position #4, which was the top of
the list - but the report states that “No country performed well enough to reach the ranking very
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good in the year’s index, meaning that no country has yet made it to one of the top three places
in the rankings.”61 Sweden, while performing better than all of the other countries, is still behind
on its goals. As for Ireland, which ranked #48, was the worst performing EU country. Meeting
its climate change goals as a country and as a part of the region remains an uphill battle for both
Ireland and Sweden, no matter their performance records.
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Chapter V - Concluding Thoughts
Assessment
This case study/comparison of Ireland and Sweden is important for analyzing the EU’s
actorness without “false uniqueness” and “false universalism.”62 This means the EU should not,
nor cannot be judged by a single, specific country’s performance without including others.
Additionally, one country’s mitigation and adaptation methods may not be possible or effective
for another. Hopefully this paper highlights where both states, as well as the EU must step up
their efforts to avoid a climate disaster. It bears repeating that case studies can provide limited
data without broader samples and scrutiny. This comparison is intended to further conversation
of the internal conditions and EU governance on climate change work. The four internal
determinants of actorness that have been discussed here must be applied to a broader sample of
EU members to better determine accuracy and relevance.
Ireland and Sweden are considered “wealthy” EU members from the Northern-Bloc,
which implies that mitigation and adaptation policies are easier to facilitate due to their financial
stability. Both have publicly and repeatedly declared commitment to climate change work but
have produced wildly different results. A generic glance at the conditions of each country might
lead one to believe they are in fact, similar. A closer look, measured by the determinants I have
outlined suggests that their internal conditions are substantially dissimilar. This does not indicate
a failure on the part of the EU to lead. It should indicate there is all the more reason for the
Union to continue act as a facilitator,63 of information and ideas, and as a harmonizer,64
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influencing policy at the regional and local level. In doing so the EU becomes a model of a
rational, liberal democracy which was the goal of its founders.
There is also some top-line, quantitative data included, gathered by IOs such as the World
Bank and the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change. While my research
consists of comparisons between these two countries, the limitations of this type of case
study/comparisons must be acknowledged. Therefore, further research is necessary, across a
more comprehensive sample of EU member states, each with their own sets of internal
conditions. Widening the scope of the sample would provide for more a more diverse review of
the EU’s potency as an actor on climate change.
The EU’s actorness is conditioned by, at the very minimum, the four determinants I have
outlined. These serve as the most basic metrics in shaping leadership, effectiveness and
therefore, actorness. Such factors enable the EU to influence normative, political and legal
objectives. Each member of the EU has varying levels of capacity, which affects its capabilities
locally and regionally. It is impossible for any single member to reduce GHGs enough to make
an impact on the international stage. Nor could one leverage any success into an impactful
leadership position. Furthermore, failure to act imperils not only one member but all members of
the EU. As an actor EU must be a regional leader or “leadiator” in uniting its members to work
together. The EU’s strength lies in its ability to leverage relationships with business, political
and activist networks in order to exert its influence on norms, beliefs and policies. and oversight.
The EU’s leadership on climate change has been essentially a top-down system of
governance. This is far more effective than scattershot efforts from individual members. Selfinterested coalescing actors create a regime with potential to leverage its power more widely and
effectively - a thoroughly Realist perspective. Interdependence, however, demands leadership,
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such as the EU’s. Wurzel et al’s (2003) description of the EU as a structural, entrepreneurial
power is quite apt in ascertaining the power the Union holds with regard to environmental policy.
Their theory on how policy instruments are driven reflects the balance and interdependence
between the EU and member states. The EU acts as a main facilitator and harmonizer of efforts
that are often driven by economic concerns. It provides a forum for processing and sharing of
ideas. This also creates a competitive environment as states will compete for advantage and to
minimize regulatory cost. Between the member states themselves, policies are transferred and
enacted upon, passively.65
In reducing GHGs, meeting the 2030 SDGs, supporting the Paris Agreement and aiming
at achieving net zero emissions by 2050, the EU’s leadership is attempting to implement all three
of the leadership modes outlined by Parker and Karlsson (2010). It is already providing
directional leadership in the form of unilateral action. The most recent example of this is the
announcement by the European Commission of the legally binding Green New Deal. The
organization also provides idea-based leadership by sharing the research and data on climate
change, creating an Informed Public then offering solutions in the form of environmental policy.
The third element of Parker and Karlsson’s leadership modes is structural leadership. By the
strictest and perhaps outdated definition, structural power is both economic and military power.
While the EU is not a military power the region does represent a formidable economic power.
The region is flexing its economic, political and environmental muscle in an attempt to set an
example for the rest of the world.
The path forward is not without considerable obstacles. The United States and China
have reentered the climate change arena, offering competition for leading actor status. Within
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the EU Ireland is not alone in its laggard status. Overall, the Eastern Bloc, representing the most
recent additions to the organization, are often incapable and/or unwilling to make the necessary
adaptations. And despite top performers such as Sweden, Denmark and Norway there is no
single member state within the Union that is on track to meet any of these goals. This all
presents significant challenges but also opportunities for significant gains.
Recommendations - A Path Forward
The EU must continue to set aggressive GHG reduction targets, to avoid a climate
disaster as well as to secure its position as a strong geopolitical actor. It must continue to adhere
to the basic elements of leadership as outlined here. They have already produced a grassroots
movement that provided the impetus for climate change prioritization. Continuation of the
rational, democratic course will continue to change norms, values and beliefs, ultimately
effecting change at the state and regional level.
1. Informed Public:
# Continue working with the UN, IPCCC and as many other IOs as possible to inform the public

on climate change events and developments. EU partnership with IOs is key in getting this
relevant climate data and research to the citizenry.
# Persist in providing the fora for information sharing and collaboration. An Informed Public

that is aware of and understands the risks will demand action be taken if the environmental
damage from GHGs and climate change goes unchecked.
# Invest in advocacy network activity in states that are slower to adapt. Informing the public of

how much of their stability is in jeopardy must be repeated until it takes hold, as it has in
Sweden and to some extent, Ireland.
2. Consensus:
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# Adopt the Irish Citizens Assembly on a regional scale. A forum of EU citizens, to vent

concerns and risks as understood by them.
# Representation across all demographics to encourage participation and awareness highlights

the EU’s reputation as a leading, democratic actor.
# Continue to incorporate activist organizations as well as political parties in order to ensure

diversity of opinion. This type of communication on a regional scale will maintain momentum
on this issue. Inclusion of the public helps build confidence that its voices and concerns are
being taken into consideration paving the way for cooperation.
# Cohesion is key to capacity. Influencing norms and beliefs are the beginning steps to cohesion

and capacity.
3. Oversight:
Carbon-tax emissions is a thorny but necessary policy. Necessary because emissions form
carbon and fossil fuels are the reason for GHGs. For the EU to maintain and strengthen this
economic policy reinforces its Oversight and therefore, actorness on the issue. Policy, combined
with an Informed Public and Consensus further highlights the gravity of the threat it is designed
to reduce.
# Taxation will generate controversy but continue to emphasize the issue.
# Maintaining awareness and pressure, particularly on the industry and agriculture is both a

challenge and opportunity.
# Leveraging the attention and pressure must continue until local governments and industries

make the necessary adaptation and mitigation adjustments, acceding to EU Oversight. It has
the legal oversight and must be willing to legislate in that capacity.
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4. Challenges:
# The EU must persist in responding to the scientific evidence. Incrementalism has dampened

reaction to environmental threats in Sweden as asserted by scholars such as Knaggard.
# Policies must now be driven by science in order to meet the level of threat. Scientific, top-

down policy from the Union is imperative to its actorness.
# Political elites must turn away from incrementalism if the EU is to credibly address this

Challenge. For some states such as Ireland, sweeping changes are required in order to
rehabilitate its reputation as a laggard.
These four determinants and recommendations highlight how the EU can and should take
action, particularly as a leadiator. They involve collaborative, multilevel efforts that will
influence norms, rules and laws on climate change, demonstrating the EU’s leadiator/leader
status as an actor. Each level and member faces its own challenges. The causes and conditions
they face are wide-ranging and complex, preventing even a single member from being on track
to meet any of the current climate change goals. This paper represents a small sample of
members. Therefore, more extensive comparisons and case studies must be conducted to test for
accuracy and relevance of these criteria.
The EU represents a vital region. For this part of the globe, there is no other organization
to legitimately act as the leader. There is no choice for the Union but to act. It is what the
organization was intended for. Perhaps not specifically on this issue but by design. Leading the
region as an organized force is precisely what its framers had in mind.
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